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DOES INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION NEED
A MANDATORY RULES METHOD?
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt*
If the articles in this volume are any guide, the role of mandatory rules in
international arbitration remains a persistent source of debate. The basic problem
is a straightforward one: contractual arbitration arises as a matter of the parties’
consent, but the resolution of contractual disputes can implicate mandatory rules
of law that are not waivable and are typically designed to protect broader public
rights. Since national legal systems began ceding the application of mandatory
rules to party-appointed arbitrators, scholars of international arbitration have
struggled to come to grips with the implications of this reality for the resolution of
cross-border disputes in which the public policy of several states is at stake.
The literature on mandatory rules has often presented the issue in stark terms,
as posing a fundamental “conflict between the will of the State having
promulgated the mandatory rules of law, on the one hand, and, on the other hand,
the will of the parties—from which [the arbitrator’s] own authority is derived.”1
Asserting an independent public duty to protect national mandatory laws as well
as the enforceability of arbitral awards, a number of writers have further urged
arbitrators to apply a so-called “mandatory rules method” to determine, regardless
of what the parties have agreed, which particular mandatory rules to apply in a
particular dispute. Although the details of the method differ from author to
author, the basic proposition is that arbitrators should apply a stand-alone
balancing test that considers, based on the nature of the rule and the connection to
the parties’ transaction, the strength of a particular state’s interest in having its
mandatory rules enforced.2
In these remarks, I take a skeptical view of the mandatory rules literature and
argue that arbitration of mandatory rules is readily handled within the standard,
contractual view of arbitration. In particular, I argue that the alleged conflict
*

Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author had the
privilege of presenting an earlier draft of this article at the Colloquium on Mandatory
Rules of Law in International Arbitration, held at Columbia Law School on June 8, 2007.
He extends his gratitude to organizers George A. Bermann and Loukas Mistelis and to the
other participants in the colloquium for their helpful comments.
1
Pierre Mayer, Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration, 2 ARB. INT’L
274 (1986).
2
See generally Mayer, supra note 1; See also Marc Blessing, Mandatory Rules of
Law versus Party Autonomy in International Arbitration, 14(4) J. INT’L ARB. 23 (1997);
Nathalie Voser, Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in
International Commercial Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration, 7 Am.
Rev. Int’l. Arb. 319 (1996); Serge Lazareff, Mandatory Extraterritorial Application of
National Law, 11(2) ARB. INT’L 137, 142 (1995); Daniel Hochstrasser, Choice of Law and
‘Foreign’ Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration, 11(1) J. INT’L ARB. 57, 85-86
(1994).
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between mandatory rules and party autonomy reflects a mistaken view of national
arbitrability doctrines that, once corrected, deprives the case for a special
mandatory rules method of much of its force. At the same time, however, the
consequences of this insight are more limited than might be supposed because
modern arbitration agreements generally give arbitrators far more authority to
consider and apply mandatory rules than advocates of the mandatory rules method
have assumed. Indeed, because arbitrators can typically claim contractual
authority to apply all applicable mandatory rules, the actual effect of relying on a
separate mandatory rules method will be to narrow rather than to expand the
number of mandatory rues within the arbitrator’s cognizance. There may be
reasons why this narrowing is prudent, but that is not a question to which the
existing literature has thus far paid much attention. Future discussion of
mandatory rules arbitration should therefore take better account both of national
arbitrability laws and the full range of options typically facing the international
arbitrator.
My discussion proceeds in two parts. I begin with a review of the national
perspective. Drawing from the United States’ experience, I consider the choices
that local courts and legislatures have in deciding whether, and to what extent, to
recognize arbitration of mandatory rules. Although the questions here are distinct
from those facing arbitrators themselves, the transnational system by which
arbitration agreements are recognized and enforced necessarily plays a critical role
in framing arbitrators’ choices. In this respect, the U.S. model provides both a
representative example of a national arbitration law and an especially important
historical force that, largely on account of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,3 provoked the original
debate over the mandatory rules method. The second part of the article turns to
the perspective of the arbitrator. Here, I critique the position that arbitrators
should apply mandatory rules not authorized by the parties’ agreement, I consider
the extent to which modern arbitration agreements nevertheless do authorize
arbitrators to apply a wide range of mandatory rules arising under different legal
systems, and I ask whether a mandatory rules method might nevertheless have a
role to play once the questions have been properly framed.4

3

473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985).
In part, this article condenses ideas that Donald Francis Donovan and I have
previously published as a book chapter. See Donald Francis Donovan and Alexander K.A.
Greenawalt, Mitsubishi After Twenty Years: Mandatory Rules Before Courts and
International Arbitrators, in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
(Loukas Mistelis & Julian Lew eds., 2006). The article goes beyond that effort, however,
in giving more sustained attention to the possible theoretical foundations that might justify
some version of the mandatory rules method. As part of this analysis, it considers the
ways which United States case law post-Mitsubishi may have weakened the nonwaivability of mandatory rules, thus establishing a national arbitration law framework that
is somewhat more conducive to the mandatory rules method than would be suggested by
Mitsubishi itself.
4
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I. MANDATORY RULES AND DOMESTIC LEGAL POLICY
Debate over domestic responses to mandatory rules arbitration reduces to one
fundamental question: Can arbitrators be entrusted with the adjudication of
domestic public policies? Although primarily a question to be answered by
individual legal systems, is also has obvious relevance to the work of international
arbitrators, both because it impacts the scope of questions submitted to arbitration
and because arbitration always takes place in the shadow of the judicial review
that a party may seek in a national court.
States wary about the possible erosion of their public policies will be tempted
to require greater oversight of mandatory rules than that afforded to contractual
claims. Domestic legal systems might prohibit arbitration of mandatory rules
entirely, or they might require courts to exercise heightened scrutiny review, for
example by reviewing de novo the merits of mandatory rule determinations at the
enforcement stage. The attraction of this approach is obvious: the domestic
state’s courts retain the ability to police the application of their own mandatory
rules, ensuring perhaps that an arbitral tribunal will not produce an enforceable
award that violates the state’s public policy.5
The fact that many states do not follow this approach, however, reflects the
potential impact upon another public policy: that favoring arbitration as a neutral
and relatively efficient means of resolving cross-border disputes between parties
who may be justifiably wary of being dragged into each others’ respective court
systems.6 The U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, has long interpreted its national
arbitration laws to impose an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution” which has “special force”7 in the international context, and we have
seen the rise of an international treaty system highly favorable to arbitration as a
means of resolving both private party and investor-state disputes.8 Judicial
determination or review of mandatory rules otherwise submitted to arbitration
raises multiple concerns: national courts may exploit their review to undo arbitral
awards for improper reasons; the efficiencies of arbitration may be lost on account
of duplicative litigation, especially where contractual and mandatory claims share
a common factual basis; and parties, cognizant of this last point, may invoke
frivolous mandatory rules claims as a deliberate means of frustrating the
arbitration agreement.
A more relaxed approach allows parties to submit mandatory rules to
conclusive arbitration without substantive judicial review. That is the course that
the U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed, most famously in its Mitsubishi decision,
which focused on the arbitrability of U.S. competition law under the Sherman Act.
5

See generally Eric A. Posner, Arbitration and the Harmonization of International
Commercial Law: A Defense of Mitsubishi, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 647, 647-49 (1999).
6
Id.
7
See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631.
8
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201208) [hereinafter N.Y. Convention].
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After finding that Respondent Soler’s Sherman Act claims were within the scope
of the parties’ arbitration clause, the Court determined the claims to be arbitrable
and dismissed Soler’s action to bring those claims in U.S. court. In famous dicta,
the Court further emphasized that arbitration was not tantamount to waiver, and
that “in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in
tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies, we
would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public
policy.”9 Accordingly, the Court also emphasized the availability of judicial
review at the award enforcement stage—Mitsubishi’s so-called “second look,”—
but cautioned that such review would be limited to “ascertain[ing] that the tribunal
took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.”10 Mitsubishi,
in sum, stands for the proposition that mandatory rules, or at least some of them,
may be conclusively left to arbitral determination, but they cannot be waived.
As should be apparent, the success of Mitsubishi’s two pillars—arbitrability
and non-waivability—depends greatly on the reliability of private arbitration as a
means of vindicating national public policies. The advisability of this approach
depends greatly in turn on how one responds to the following three questions,
which I consider in turn:
A. Is Mitsubishi Worth the Risk of Under-Enforcement of Mandatory Rules in
Individual Cases?
As the premise of this question reflects, Mitsubishi’s highly deferential review
of arbitrated mandatory rule disputes will necessarily lead to some underenforcement of mandatory law. Arbitrators applying mandatory rules will of
course reach the wrong decision in some cases. Because Mitsubishi deprives
courts of substantive judicial review over arbitrable mandatory rules claims that
the arbitrators have “taken cognizance of” and “actually decided,” bad decisions
will remain uncorrected in cases in which more substantive review would have
caught and corrected the adjudicator’s error. Those for whom this consideration
alone is a deal breaker will reject the Mitsubishi approach.
The reason that arbitration of mandatory rules has nonetheless received
judicial tolerance reflects at least two inter-related considerations beyond the
general public policy favoring arbitration. First, because arbitration itself is
voluntary, there is no guarantee that mandatory rules violations will receive
judicial enforcement in the first place: the parties are free to settle their claims
and may even fail to pursue them. From this perspective, a party who receives a
bad arbitration award may seem little different from a party who has entered into a
disadvantageous settlement award that fails to capture the full value of her claim.
Second, and more fundamentally, the possibility of individual bad outcomes is
far more palatable if there is no reason to expect ex ante that arbitration will
provide a less secure means of vindicating mandatory rules than litigation. As
9
10

Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637.
Id. at 638.
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long as parties have no particular expectation that they can escape mandatory rules
by entering into arbitration agreements, those rules will vindicate public policy by
exerting a deterrent effect, and parties weighing whether to bring or settle claims
will do so in the shadow of mandatory law. Arbitrators may, of course, end up
under-enforcing mandatory rules in the individual case, but this prospect may not
affect the parties’ behavior as long as the arbitrators are just as likely to err in the
other direction by over-enforcing mandatory law.11
Even so, one might seek to distinguish between mandatory rules, perhaps
ceding arbitrators greater deference in the economic sphere of competition and
securities laws while perhaps exercising greater scrutiny in areas like
discrimination law that speak to deeper, dignitary values that might seem the more
appropriate province of the judiciary. The U.S. courts, for their part, have by and
large rejected such distinctions and have instead applied the Mitsubishi framework
broadly in cases where a statute establishing privately enforceable mandatory
rules is silent on the question of arbitrability.12
B. Is Private Arbitration Biased Against the Enforcement of Mandatory Rules?
In light of the above, the most sustained academic criticism of Mitsubishi
approach has focused not on the prospect that individual arbitrations might underenforce mandatory rules, but on the fear that the arbitral system may be
systematically predisposed toward that result. Concern here has focused on the
fact that arbitrators are paid by the parties and selected according to a mechanism
of the parties’ choice. As Eric Posner has argued, “arbitrators would want to
ignore mandatory rules because they know that merchants, ex ante, prefer that
their contracts be enforced as written and would prefer to pay for the services of
arbitrators who enforce the contract rather than the mandatory rules that the
contract may violate.”13 Following Andrew Guzman’s more careful elaboration of
this insight, the proposition must be that arbitral appointing institutions—also paid
by the parties—reflect this bias, because typically it is the appointing institution,
and not the individual arbitrator, whom the contract selects ex ante before a
dispute has arisen.14 Thus, the theory is that appointing institutions, when acting
11

Notably, the Mitsubishi court expressly “decline[d] to indulge the presumption that
the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain
competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators.” Id. at 634.
12
See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967); EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 748-49 (9th Cir. 2003) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 151 (1st Cir. 1998) (Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990).
13
Posner, supra note 5, at 650.
14
Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory
Rules, 49 DUKE L. J. 1279, 1302-07 (2000). Procedures for appointing arbitrators are
generally provided in a set of procedural rules that the parties designate in their contract.
Often those rules are promulgated by an arbitral institution such as the International
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to select sole or tie-breaking arbitrators, will choose arbitrators biased against
mandatory rules. By contrast, party-selected arbitrators should not be expected on
balance to reflect this bias, because each party will have the opportunity to select
an arbitrator after the dispute has arisen, at which point the parties will make their
selections in full knowledge of whether they wish to urge or oppose application of
a mandatory rule, and can take this circumstance into consideration.
To the extent one may draw conclusions based on the discussion at the
symposium giving rise to this volume, this account of arbitrator bias does not find
much sympathy among the elite group of scholars and practitioners who actually
serve as arbitrators in the kinds of disputes supervised by the major international
appointing institutions. Of course, bias need not be conscious: one can imagine a
world in which all arbitrators conscientiously seek to apply applicable law and
achieve the “right” result but are nevertheless drawn from a slanted pool that,
statistically speaking, is less likely to enforce mandatory rules than the average
court in the jurisdiction that promulgated the rule. But such conjecture rests on
too many untested assumptions that caution against reaching firm conclusions—
not to speak of policy prescriptions—based on the simple fact that arbitrators are
paid by the parties. One would need to know something about the actual demand
for mandatory rule evasion among parties who sign on to arbitration clauses, and
in particular whether such demand is significant enough to affect the economics of
appointing institutions. One would also need to take account of other arbitrator
incentives pointing in the other direction, incentives such as the general desire to
provide the neutral and competent decision-making that so many parties seek from
international arbitration (and fear that they cannot receive from the national courts
of the other party), and the reputational interests of arbitrators both inside and
outside the arbitral community.
The complexity of the issue suggests, at minimum, that the specter of arbitral
bias must be assessed as an empirical question, not simply a theoretical one. And
here, the existing evidence is at best inconclusive. Studies have failed thus far to
establish bias in arbitration generally, including, for example, in the context of
domestic U.S. employment disputes where the prevalence of repeat player
defendants would seem to create a clear incentive for bias against plaintiffs.15
Focusing on the specific issue of mandatory rules, some commentators, Donald
Francis Donovan and myself included, have noted the general dearth of U.S. case
law challenging post-Mitsubishi mandatory rule determinations by international
arbitrators, suggesting perhaps that under-enforcement of mandatory rules is not
as common a feature of the system as some have feared.16
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the American Arbitration Association (AAA), in which
case the promulgating institution will generally be designated as the appointing authority.
The commonly used UNCITRAL Rules provide for ad hoc arbitration with the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in The Hague, The Netherlands serving as the appointing authority.
15
For a summary of the literature with citations, see W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From
Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study of Employment
Arbitration, __ Mich. J. L. Ref. __ (forthcoming, 2008)
16
See Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 38; Posner, supra note 5, at 667-68.
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C. Is Mitsubishi Justified Even It Results in the Under-Enforcement of
Mandatory Rules?
Even if arbitration of mandatory rules does result in some under-enforcement
of national public policies, might the Mitsubishi approach be justified
nonetheless?17 The issue might be viewed as one of balancing competing public
policies: the public policy in favor of arbitration versus the public policies
reflected by mandatory rules. William Park has noted, for example, that a “special
rule of arbitrability for the international realm would be justified under a hierarchy
of societal policies that take into account the peculiar need for neutrality in
resolution of international contracts disputes.”18
Although Mitsubishi’s anti-waiver principle would seem opposed to such
balancing, lower federal courts have used the precedent to do precisely that. In a
series of cases arising out of the Lloyd’s of London bankruptcy, and exemplified
by Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s,19 the federal courts of appeals have enforced
arbitration and judicial forum selection agreements even on the assumption that
English courts and arbitrators would not enforce applicable U.S. securities and
racketeering laws invoked by the plaintiffs. Emphasizing considerations of
comity, the Roby Court reached this somewhat surprising outcome by effectively
redefining the non-waivable “right” protected by Mitsubishi to be one that allows
some dilution of mandatory law.20 The fundamental question, in the Court’s view,
was not whether the specific content of U.S. mandatory law would apply, but
instead whether the available remedies were sufficient to vindicate the statutory
policies underlying that mandatory law. Although English law allowed neither the
“controlling person” liability of U.S. securities law nor the treble damages offered
by the RICO statute, the Court reasoned that English law was nevertheless
sufficient “to deter British issuers from exploiting American investors through
fraud, misrepresentation or inadequate disclosure.”21 In other words, while
mandatory rules must be protected, that protection may take a diluted form.
17

An added complexity which deserves mention is that not all cases of reduced
enforcement properly count as under-enforcement. One obvious example is the fear that
national courts are biased against foreign parties. If that fear is justified, then arbitration
may well avoid the illegitimate and discriminatory application of mandatory rules by
national courts in cases involving foreign parties. Similar, although more complex, is the
situation in which a nation’s courts are more aggressive about the application of
mandatory rules than the legislature intended or than might otherwise be desirable
according to some other benchmark. The latter problem raises the difficult question of
how exactly one measures the “correct” amount of mandatory rule enforcement.
18
See William W. Park, Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The Expanding
Scope of International Arbitration, 12 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 629, 667 (1986).
19
996 F.2d 1353, 1361-66 (2d Cir. 1993). See also Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121
F.3d 956, 969-70 (5th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928-30 (4th
Cir. 1996); Bonny v. Soc’y of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156, 161-62 (7th Cir. 1993).
20
Roby, 996 F.2d at 1364-65.
21
Id. at 1365.
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II. THE MANDATORY RULES METHOD
I turn now to the perspective of the arbitrator deciding whether or not to apply
a particular mandatory rule in a particular dispute. Although distinct from the
question of arbitrability, the debate over what arbitrators should do with
mandatory law has focused heavily on the implications—both real and
perceived—of national arbitration law. Beginning with Pierre Mayer’s seminal
article published shortly after the Mitsubishi decision, the debate has largely been
defined by the writings of those who, like Mayer, have urged the adoption of a
special “mandatory rules method” to govern arbitration of mandatory rules. The
argument proceeds roughly as follows: By ceding arbitrators the authority to
apply mandatory national law, decisions like Mitsubishi have exploded the
traditional contractual basis of arbitration.22 Because mandatory rules are not
subject to party consent, the parties’ own choice of law cannot bind the
arbitrator’s determination of which, if any, mandatory law to apply. The arbitrator
must therefore move beyond the contract and make an independent
determination—typically via a balancing test based on the totality of the
circumstances—of which states’ mandatory rules deserve application in a
particular dispute.23 The precise criteria vary from author to author, but generally
draw inspiration from conflict of laws doctrines applied in domestic courts, in
particular Article 7 of the European Union’s Rome Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, which provides that states parties may give
effect to “to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the
situation has a close connection.”24
As I outline below, arbitrability of mandatory rules does not in fact involve a
departure from the contractual basis of arbitration. That fact alone, however, does
not doom the mandatory rules method, because in most cases the contract itself
will afford arbitrators great discretion to determine whether and which mandatory
rules should apply. Seen in its proper context, however, the mandatory rules
method is the progeny not of Mitsubishi, but of the Roby line of cases. In other
22

Blessing, supra note 2, at 38 (“under the US perspectives set on the basis of
Mitsubishi v. Soler and the threat of the ‘second-look doctrine’, it is quite clear that an
arbitral tribunal has a perceived duty, and not only a right, to examine the compatibility
with US antitrust laws ex officio, wherever a matter could have anti-competitive effects
within the United States.”); Mayer, supra note 1, at 297-80 (The [Mitsubishi] decision is
nonetheless of fundamental importance in that it demonstrates the connection between the
issue of the right to apply mandatory rules and the obligation to do so. In holding that
arbitrators have a right to apply such rules, the Supreme Court appears to presume that
they are in some manner obliged to do so, which in turn makes it possible to trust them in
this matter.”).
23
See generally Mayer, supra note 1; Blessing, supra note, 2; Voser, supra note 2;
Lazareff, supra note 2.
24
Rome Convention, Art. 7, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1. The Convention will be replaced
by Regulation No. 593/2008 of June 17, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L. 177) 6, when the Regulation
enters into force in 2009.
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words, it is a method which operates to limit rather than expand the mandatory
law potentially applicable in arbitration. Whether such limitation is in fact
desirable remains a question that has received insufficient consideration.
A. Mandatory Rules Beyond the Arbitration Clause
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. During the course of their
contractual negotiations, Soler discovers that Mitsubishi has a reputation for anticompetitive practices. Desiring the protections of the Sherman Act, and fearing
that a panel of Japanese arbitrators will be reluctant to vindicate U.S. competition
laws, Soler succeeds in narrowing its contractual arbitration clause via express
language stating that the arbitration agreement shall not extend to claims or
defenses arising out of the Sherman Act. By doing so, Soler does not seek to
waive mandatory law, but instead merely wishes to preserve a judicial forum for
any such claims or defenses. Surely, an arbitrator faced with this language would
not be justified in bypassing the contract and applying the Sherman Act
nonetheless on account of a mandatory rules method. Indeed, an arbitrator who
did so would jeopardize the award under Article V(1)(c) of the New York
Convention which permits courts to refused enforcement where “[t]he award deals
with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration.”25
As this hypothetical suggests, the mandatory nature of competition law must
not be confused with the discretionary nature of arbitration itself. Just as no one is
forced to sign contractual arbitration clauses in the first place, no one should be
forced to arbitrate disputes arising under mandatory rules. The point of
Mitsubishi’s anti-waiver principle is that some forum must remain available for
the vindication of mandatory rules, but that forum need not be an arbitral forum.
This basic logic provides a contractual rationale for mandatory rules
arbitration that stands up remarkably well to the arguments put forward by those
who urge arbitrators to look beyond the contract. It is true, for example, that
arbitral refusal to take cognizance of a mandatory rule may result in that rule
being bypassed because the victorious party seeks enforcement in a jurisdiction
that does not recognize the rule.26 Assuming Soler had assets in Japan, one can
imagine Mitsubishi enforcing an eventual arbitral award there, thus avoiding the
U.S. court system and, to the extent the Japanese courts refused to apply it, the
Sherman Act as well. But that would also be the result in the event that the parties
had never entered into an arbitration agreement in the first instance and Mitsubishi
had pursued its case in Japanese court from the very beginning. And in both cases
25

N.Y. Convention, supra note 8.
This particular concern prompted debate among the participants at the June 8, 2007
Colloquium on Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration at Columbia Law
School, where I presented an earlier draft of this paper. The broader concern that
arbitration might provide a means of evading applicable mandatory rules has been a
constant theme of the mandatory rules literature since Mayer wrote on the topic in 1986.
See Mayer, supra note 1.
26
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Soler remains free to pursue its Sherman Act claim in U.S. court. That route may
or not provide an effective remedy: much depends on the strength of the claim,
whether the U.S. courts will entertain it, where enforcement will be sought, and
what effect, if necessary, foreign courts will give to the outcome of the U.S.
proceeding. But these potential roadblocks exists regardless of the existence of an
arbitration agreement.
A second argument observes that the arbitrator’s refusal to apply a mandatory
rule may lead to the annulment or non-enforcement of the resulting award, thus
violating the arbitrator’s putative duty to produce an enforceable award.27 But
what exactly is the nature of this duty, such as it may exist? It is, of course,
reasonable to assume that when parties elect to submit their disputes to arbitration,
they do so with the expectation that this method will prove effective and efficient.
Indeed, parties will often adopt procedural rules that explicitly instruct the
arbitrators to safeguard award enforceability.28 But this is merely to say that a
general duty to protect enforceability can be implied from the parties’ agreement.
It is a very different proposition to argue that arbitrators should invoke this duty as
means of exceeding or violating the parties’ agreement, particularly where
application of a mandatory rule excluded by the parties will operate to change the
result of the dispute. This approach is especially problematic in cases where the
arbitrator does not know where enforcement will be pursued, or where a
victorious claimant has the ability to enforce the award in multiple jurisdictions.
For example, an arbitrator invoking a public policy against punitive damages
drawn from the anticipated jurisdiction of enforcement might end up denying
significant relief to a deserving claimant who actually intends to enforce in a
different jurisdiction that has no such rule.
A third argument focuses on scenarios in which the parties’ motive for
excluding arbitration of mandatory rules might be less pure than in the
hypothetical I posed above. It might be the case, for example, that the parties
have entered into an illegal venture involving money laundering, bribery, child
trafficking or some other corrupt activity. Wishing to resolve a particular dispute
without calling attention to the illicit nature of their transaction, the parties
commit to arbitration but preclude the tribunal from applying the mandatory rules
that render the entire contract unenforceable. Although the arbitrator could simply
resolve the contractual dispute while leaving mandatory law for the enforcing
court to apply, the arbitrator may well be in a better position to detect the
illegality, given the richer factual record before her, and the disincentive the
parties may have to raise the issue before an enforcing court. The arbitrator
27

See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 1. (“[The arbitrator] should seek to respect the contract
and the intent of the parties, but at the same time be concerned with the efficacy of his
award and the avoidance of annulment.”)
28
For example, Article 35 of the ICC Rules establish the “general rule” that “[i]n all
matters not expressly provided for in these Rules, the Court and the Arbitral Tribunal shall
act in the spirit of these Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that the Award is
enforceable at law.”
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should also have well founded ethical concerns about deciding the dispute in the
first instance.
This last hypothetical presents a more troubling scenario, but for reasons that
will be clarified below, it properly arises only when the parties explicitly exclude
arbitral application of one or more mandatory rules. My sense, however, is that
this is a rare scenario, and certainly not the case that advocates of the mandatory
rules method seem to have in mind as their paradigmatic model. Although parties
should certainly be allowed to reserve mandatory rules claims for the courts,
doing so by way of an explicit contractual provision in order to cloak illicit
activity would only seem to risk calling the courts’ attention to that activity. It is
also not the typical case in which privately invocable mandatory rules are likely to
prove meaningful: generally speaking, private enforcement of mandatory rules
offers an effective deterrent because one of the parties will have an incentive to
invoke the rule after a dispute arises. For obvious reasons, private enforcement
will provide weaker protections in cases where both parties persist in cloaking
their mutually illegal activity even after a dispute has arisen.
In any event, the arbitrator facing such a contract has several options. One
possibility is to simply refuse to decide the dispute on ethical grounds. Another is
to decide the dispute but expose the potential illegality in a way designed to draw
the attention of an enforcing court.29 Finally, to the extent that the mandatory rule
violation is one that draws universal or near universal condemnation from the
world’s legal systems, the arbitrator might invoke the rule as a matter of so-called
“truly international public policy.”30 Although this last option resembles the
mandatory rules method to the extent that it contemplates an arbitrator applying
law beyond the scope of the contractual mandate, truly international public policy
(so-named to distinguish it from specialized domestic public policy doctrines that
are applicable to international disputes) should be less controversial to the extent
the doctrine focuses on the clearest cases of illicit activity that violates universal
public policies shared by every or virtually every modern legal system.31 If the
mandatory rules method were only concerned with this narrow set of cases, then
surely it would not have occasioned the debate that it has.
B. Mandatory Rules Within the Contract
If advocates of the mandatory rules method have failed to explain why
vindication of national public policies requires arbitrators to look beyond the
29

Of course, the parties might well settle the dispute post-arbitration without ever
reaching the courts.
30
See, e.g., Yves Derains, Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in
International Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY
IN ARBITRATION 227, 251-52 (ICCA Congress Series No. 3, Pieter Sanders ed., 1986).
31
Note, however, that not all advocates of applying truly international public policy
have viewed the doctrine in such narrow terms. See id. (including within the category of
“truly international public policy” situations in which enforcement of a contract would
violate the law of the place of performance)
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litigants’ contract, the irony is that such adventurism may almost never be
necessary in order to give effect to applicable mandatory rules. In this respect, the
perceived necessity of the mandatory rules method on the part of its advocates
appears to flow from an overly narrow view of the arbitrator’s mandate in the
standard case. In particular, much of the literature appears to rest on the mistaken
assumption that application of any mandatory rule arising under a law other than
that specified by the parties necessarily creates some tension with arbitration’s
contractual foundations.32 In fact, the international arbitrator will typically have
adequate contractual authority to look to additional mandatory laws, and in many
instances will even be required to do so.
The clearest example of this phenomenon is where the parties’ choice of law
itself gives effect to foreign mandatory law, as is the case where the doctrine of
force majeure excuses a contractual obligation based on an unforeseen illegality in
the place of performance regardless of whether or not the conduct in question is
independently proscribed by the law governing the dispute. 33 The parties’ chosen
law may also prohibit the parties from employing a choice-of-law clause as a
means of evading an illegality in the place of performance.34 In such cases,
arbitral reliance on the law of the place of performance can hardly be described as
a departure from the contract. Nevertheless, commentators have analyzed the
arbitral case law in these terms. The Swiss Hilmarton/OTV case, for example, has
been described as “clear application of the mandatory rules approach, under which
the arbitrator felt entitled to give effect to the mandatory rules of a law other than
that governing the contract.”35 Yet the case report reveals that the arbitrators
applied an Algerian prohibition on the use of intermediaries to invalidate a
contract not because they claimed extra-contractual authority, but because they
believed that the parties’ contractual choice of Swiss law required them to honor
the public policies of the place of performance.36 Indeed, a previous review that
32

Surveying the literature, Lazareff concludes, for example, that “[t]here is a growing
tendency of arbitrators to consider that they are exercising a judicial function that goes
beyond the will of the parties, thus accepting more and more frequently the need to take
account of laws other than the lex contractus.” Lazareff, supra note 2, at 142.
33
See, e.g., FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 849
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) (noting that “a law other than that
governing the contract which prohibits the export of goods under the conditions set forth
in the contract could be considered, under the law governing the contract, to be a force
majeure event”).
34
For example, courts applying New York law have held that a contract that is
otherwise unobjectionable under New York law should not be enforced if the contract
violates the law of its place of performance and the parties entered into the contract with
the intent to violate that foreign law. See Lehman Bros. Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals
Int’l Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., 179 F. Supp.2d 118, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
35
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 33 at 854; see also JULIAN LEW,
LOUKAS MISTELIS & STEFAN KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 422 (2003) (same).
36
Final Award in Case No. 5622 of 1988, XIX Y.B. COM. ARB. 105 (1994).
Switzerland’s Court of Appeal disagreed and annulled the award on the ground that the
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Donovan and I conducted of the cases cited in the mandatory rules literature
confirms Fouchard et al.’s more general observation that there are “virtually no
cases where the arbitrators have relied on the application of a mandatory rule to
justify a decision other than that would have resulted from the application of the
law chosen by the parties.”37
Even where the parties’ choice-of-law clause does not require application of
foreign mandatory law, it rarely precludes it. That is because contractual dispute
resolution clauses are typically broader than choice-of-law provisions. Parties
routinely commit to arbitration not merely breach-of-contract claims, but a
broader range of actions having some nexus to the contractual relationship. The
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), for example, urges parties to use a
model arbitration clause dictating that “[a]ll disputes arising out of or in
connection with the present contract shall be finally settled under the Rules of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators
appointed in accordance with the said Rules.”38 Although the efficiencies of
broad arbitration clauses are readily apparent—they help parties reduce the risk of
having their disputes split between multiple fora—, it is also largely on account of
these provisions that the mandatory rules claims become subject to arbitration.
Choice-of-law provisions, on the other hand, are typically narrower. They tend to
specify the law “governing” the contract itself,39 not the law applicable to all
disputes “arising out of or in connection” with the contract.
The critical point is that arbitrators facing this standard pairing of broad
arbitration provision and narrow choice-of-law clause need not limit their
consideration of mandatory rules to those arising under the parties’ chosen
contractual law. The Mitsubishi case itself is illustrative. Although the contract
contained a provision choosing Swiss law, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the
parties’ submission that the dispute resolution provision encompassed Soler’s
Sherman Act and RICO claims arising under U.S. law, and it noted that these
claims were in fact before the arbitrators.40 This logic applies most clearly to noncontractual claims, but the savvy arbitrator might even extend a similar argument
to contractual defenses on the ground that, unless the parties have specified
otherwise, choice-of-law clauses should be read as limited to waivable default
rules and not extending to any applicable mandatory law whether affirmative or
arbitrator had misapplied Swiss law and that the result was arbitrary. Tribunal Fédéral
[Supreme Court], 17 April 1990, XIX Y.B. COM. ARB. 214, 217 (1994). There was no
disagreement, however, that the issue was one of correctly applying the parties’ own
choice of Swiss law.
37
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 33, at 856-57; Donovan &
Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 54.
38
International Chamber of Commerce, “The standard ICC arbitration clause:
Drafting the arbitration agreement,” available at
http://iccwbo.org/court/english/
arbitration/model_clause.asp.
39
Looking again to the ICC, its rules advise that “it may also be desirable for the
parties to stipulate in the arbitration clause itself . . . the law governing the contract.” Id.
40
See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19.
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defensive in nature. A true conflict between the parties’ agreement and
consideration of mandatory law may not arise, in other words, unless an arbitrator
faces a rare instance in which the contract expressly excludes consideration of
mandatory law. To the extent arbitrators adopt this approach, conflicts between
contractual law and mandatory law will largely disappear.
C. Is There an Alternate Basis for the Mandatory Rules Method?
By now it may seem that there is less than meets the eye to the debate on
arbitration of mandatory rules. The standard arguments for ignoring the parties’
contractual commitments appear to rest on a mistaken reading of the Mitsubishi
decision and are not persuasive on their own terms. And this point itself may
largely be moot because arbitrators routinely can find authority within the parties’
agreement to apply applicable mandatory rules. Still, this reappraisal of the
debate does not eliminate the problem of mandatory rules in international
arbitration. The fact remains that whether or not there is authority in the contract
to apply mandatory rules, the arbitrator still faces the question of which, if any,
mandatory rules to invoke. The simple answer, of course, is that the arbitrator
should obey the contract. But that prescription is of little help when the
contractual command is far from clear in the face of a broadly phrased dispute
resolution clause that does not provide clear instructions on the matter. If
anything, contractual language of this sort operates as a kind of delegation from
the parties to the arbitrators to determine which laws to apply. How should the
arbitrator go about this task? Does a distinct mandatory rules method have any
role to play in this context?
To unpack this question, it helps to start with the maximal option. Why
shouldn’t arbitrators simply apply any applicable mandatory rules that are not
expressly excluded by the contract? The Mitsubishi arbitrators, for example,
would not need to choose between U.S. and Japanese competition laws. In the
event that the laws of both states (or a even a third state) extended to the parties’
conduct, the arbitrators could simply entertain and decide all applicable claims.
Mitsubishi’s anti-waiver principle itself supports this approach as a policy matter:
If parties are not allowed to waive applicable mandatory law, arbitration will
prove more effective if the arbitrators take cognizance of more rather than fewer
mandatory claims. After all, as I have already detailed, a decision to limit or
exclude consideration of mandatory rules may well preserve those rules for the
courts, leading to additional, potentially duplicative proceedings that undermine
the parties’ decision to employ arbitration.
Seen in this light, the prevalence of dispute resolution clauses reaching more
broadly than choice-of-law clauses makes sense. Where waivable default rules
are at issue, the parties to the contract can make their agreement more concrete
and predictable by choosing the body of law that will govern contractual
interpretation. But unless the parties actually wish to preserve certain mandatory
claims for the courts, there is no point in limiting arbitrable mandatory rules to
those arising under only one particular set of national laws. Thus, the maximal
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approach provides a plausible reading of the parties’ legitimate expectations in
cases where the contract does not specify an approach to mandatory rules.
What then of the balancing approach endorsed by advocates of the mandatory
rules method? As should already be apparent, this approach needs to be
recharacterized. In the vast majority of cases—and indeed in virtually all of the
cases cited in the literature41—the balancing approach does not, as frequently
claimed, involve reaching beyond the parties’ agreement in furtherance of some
higher duty to protect national public policies. What the method does instead is
provide a way of narrowing the range of mandatory rules that might otherwise be
authorized by the contract.
Taken at face value, this strategy would appear to be self-defeating given the
non-waivability of the rules being excluded. However, the picture becomes more
complex on account of two inter-related considerations. The first of these is that
my argument in favor of the maximal approach rests on the perhaps overly
simplistic assumption that international arbitrators are able to identify and apply
all of the substantive mandatory law that would otherwise control the dispute were
the parties to pursue their remedies in multiple national fora. But doing so may
not always be so simple a task. To truly mirror the likely result in national courts,
arbitrators would need to consider not only the substantive applicability of those
rules,42 but also a range of court access issues such as jurisdiction and forum
convenience. Would the relevant court system possess personal jurisdiction over
the suit? What role would doctrines such as forum non conveniens and
international comity play in each potential forum? How would each particular
court respond to the possibility of parallel proceedings in different countries, and
what effect would each court (particularly in jurisdictions where assets are
located) give to foreign judgments concerning the same dispute? And what effect
would each jurisdiction give to foreign mandatory rules in resolving the merits of
the dispute? In addition, arbitrators might find that different mandatory rules
conflict with each other, preventing a single resolution to the dispute which gives
each rule its due. One state’s mandatory rule requiring punitive damages might,
for example, run up against another state’s prohibition on such damages.43 In
complex disputes touching upon multiple jurisdictions, it may simply be
41

Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 54.
In assessing whether to apply statutes outside U.S. territory, for example, courts
have at times employed a multi-factor comity analysis inspired by the very kind of choiceof-law balancing that underlies the mandatory rules method. See Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1976); cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). What this means is that an arbitrator following this
approach would have to undertake substantially the same analysis in applying the Sherman
Act itself as required by advocates of the mandatory rules method.
43
Arbitrators might in theory deal with this conflict problem by acknowledging the
conflict and leaving it to the national courts to decide which parts of the award they wish
to enforce. For example, an arbitrator might award punitive damages under one
mandatory law while noting simultaneously the prohibition of another mandatory law,
leaving it to the latter jurisdiction to refuse enforcement if it so wishes.
42
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impossible—not to speak of costly and time consuming—for an arbitrator to
confidently determine exactly which mandatory rules would be available to the
parties absent the arbitration agreement. For the arbitrator wishing to avoid
wading into these difficulties, some kind of stand-alone mandatory rules method
might provide a more streamlined and manageable approach that provides a
decent approximation of the result the parties would otherwise be able to achieve.
The second, perhaps farther reaching consideration, is that national courts
may approve of arbitral reliance on some form of mandatory rules method. As the
Lloyd’s cases reflect, the non-waivable character of mandatory rules can be
recharacterized to focus on protecting the core interests behind the mandatory rule
rather than on honoring every aspect of the rule as codified in a particular national
law. One must be careful not to make too much of these precedents, but the
reasoning exemplified by the Roby decision has potentially far reaching
consequences for the arbitrator, whose goal need no longer be to apply all
applicable mandatory laws, but instead to select and apply laws whose protections
are sufficient to advance the various policies of those states claiming an interest in
the dispute. One consequence of this shift may be to mollify, to some degree, the
concerns of those who fear that, biased or not, international arbitrators lack the
competence to give national mandatory rules their due. If, for example, foreigntrained arbitrators find it difficult to navigate the complexities of U.S. securities
laws, perhaps the situation is not so dire if those arbitrators are free to select and
apply the laws of a cognate legal system with which they are more familiar.
An even farther reaching question is whether there is anything in the Roby
approach that limits the analysis to national mandatory laws. Indeed, if the goal is
simply to apply some law that is adequate to protect the policy interests
underlying a particular mandatory law, then one might even imagine the
harmonization of national laws into a common international or transnational
mandatory law that arbitrators rely upon irrespective of the particulars of any
given case. That of course remains a distant goal, and it is one certain to be
fraught with difficulties.
CONCLUSION
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a comprehensive evaluation of
these issues. I will conclude, however, with the more modest proposal that future
work on the mandatory rules method take more careful account of the context
within which arbitrators select and apply mandatory rules. These include not only
national policies concerning the arbitrability of mandatory rules, but also national
laws governing the consequences of both arbitral refusal to entertain mandatory
rules and arbitral overreaching in the form of applying laws not authorized by the
parties’ agreement. Perhaps most importantly, as I have already suggested,
advocates of the mandatory rules method should grapple with the fact that, in the
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vast majority of cases, this method provides a mechanism not to honor public
policies ignored by the contract, but instead to limit the range of mandatory rules
which the contract otherwise might make applicable. Further work on the
mandatory rules method should proceed from this realization.

